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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [VoL 18:1388
REMOVAL OF CASES-POWER TO REMOVE-CONFLICTING
JURISDICTION OF STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS
Carter v. Hill & Hill Track Line, Inc., 259 F. Supp.
429 (S.D. Tex. 1966).
Section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act' provides that
an employee subject to the act2 may maintain an action against his
employer for the recovery of unpaid minimum wages or overtime
compensation "in any court of competent jurisdiction."' Repeatedly
this provision has been construed to give state and federal courts
concurrent original jurisdiction of such actions.4
Whether such an action may be removed from a state court to
a federal district court has been the subject of considerable contro-
versy since the passage of the Fair Labor Standards Act.5 The fed-
1 Fair Labor Standards Act § 16(b), 52 Stat. 1069 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
S 216(b) (1964) [hereinafter cited as FISAJ.2 FLSA § 3(b), 52 Stat. 1060 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 203(b) (1964).
Employees of employers conducting commerce which is defined as trade "among the sev-
eral States or between any State or from any State and any place outside thereof" are sub-
ject to the FLSA.
3 FLSA § 16(b), 52 Stat. 1069 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1964).
4 E.g., Johnson v. Butler Bros., 162 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1947). See also IA MOORE,
FEDERAL PRAcTicB 5 0.167[51, at 962 (2d ed. 1965), where Professor Moore points
out that the cases have consistently held § 16(b) actions to have arisen under an act of
Congress regulating interstate commerce, so that the federal district courts might prop-
erly exercise original jurisdiction even though the ten thousand dollar minimum amount
in controversy required for ordinary "federal question" jurisdiction is not present. See
28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337 (1964).
5 Since 1938 forty-seven cases have passed on the issue of removability of a § 16(b)
cause.
Cases prior to 1948 denying removal: Johnson v. Butler Bros., 162 F.2d 87 (8th
Cat. 1947); Maloy v. Friedman, 80 F. Supp. 290 (N.D. Ohio 1948); McGuire v. North
Am. Aviation, Inc., 69 F. Supp. 917 (W.D. Mo. 1946); Crouse v. North Am. Aviation,
68 F. Supp. 934 (W.D. Mo. 1946); Young v. Arbyrd Compress Co., 66 F. Supp. 241
(E.D. Mo. 1946); Smith v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 209 (S.D. Iowa 1946);
Tobin v. Hercules Powder Co., 63 F. Supp. 434 (D. Del. 1945); Sheridan v. Leitner,
59 F. Supp. 1011 (S.D.N.Y. 1944); Wright v. Long, 65 F. Supp. 279 (W.D. Mo. 1944);
Steiner v. Pleasantville Constructors, Inc., 59 F. Supp. 1011 (S.D.N.Y. 1944); Brock-
way v. Long, 55 F. Supp. 79 (W.D. Mo. 1944); Apple v. Shulman, 65 F. Supp. 677
(D.N.J. 1943); Adams v. Long, 65 F. Supp. 310 (W.D. Mo. 1943); Brantley v. Augusta
Ice & Coal, Co., 52 F. Supp. 158 (S.D. Ga. 1943); Garner v. Mengel Co., 50 F. Supp. 794
(W.D. Ky. 1943); Fredman v. Foley Bros., 50 F. Supp. 161 (W.D. Mo. 1943); Duval
v. Protes, 51 F. Supp. 967 (E.D.N.Y. 1942); Booth v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 44 F.
Supp. 451 (D. Neb. 1942); Phillips v. Pucci, 43 F. Supp. 253 (W.D. Mo. 1942); Kuli-
gowski v. Hart, 43 F. Supp. 207 (N.D. Ohio 1941); Stewart v. Hickman, 36 F. Supp.
861 (W.D. Mo. 1941); Wingate v. General Auto Parts Co., 4o F. Supp. 364 (W.D.
Mo. 1941); Bell Aircraft Corp. v. Anderson, 73 Ga. App. 633, 38 S.E.2d 66 (1946).
Cases prior to 1948 allowing removal: Aaker v. Kaiser Co., 74 F. Supp. 55 (D. Ore.
1947); Koskala v. Butler Bros., 65 F. Supp. 276 (D. Minn. 1946); Swettman v. Rem-
ington Rand, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 940 (S.D. Ill. 1946); Ellems v. Nick F. Helmers, Inc.,
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eral court for the Southern District of Texas, in Carter v. Hill &
Hill Truck Line, Inc.,8 opposed the modern weight of authority7
by disallowing removal and remanding a section 16(b) cause to the
Texas state court in which it was initially brought. The Carter
decision, along with Wilkins v. Renault Southwest, Inc.,8 has at
least rekindled conflict over an issue that Professor Moore had con-
sidered to be "apparently settled in favor of removal."9  The pro-
priety of the Carter decision's denial of removal cannot be fully
assessed unless reference is made to the historical context of forty-
six earlier cases ruling on the issue."
Prior to the 1948 revision of the federal removal statute' as
part of the revamping of the entire Judicial Code, a strong majority
of cases held against removal.' There was, however, no unanim-
ity of theory in the cases comprising this majority. A large per-
centage of cases' 3 espousing the early majority view turned upon the
construction of section 16(b) of the act. These cases construed
"maintain," as used in section 16(b), to mean "to prosecute to final
65 F. Supp. 566 (E.D.N.Y. 1944); Sonnesyn v. Federal Cartridge Co., 54 F. Supp. 29
(D. Minn. 1944); Cox v. Gatliff Coal Co., 52 F. Supp. 482 (E.D. Ky. 1943); Harris v.
Reno Oil Co., 48 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Tex. 1943); Owens v. Greenville News-Piedmont,
43 F. Supp. 785 (W.D.S.C. 1942); McGarrigle v. 11 West Forty-Second St. Corp., 48
F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Ricciardi v. Iazzara Baking Corp., 32 F. Supp. 956
(D.N.J. 1940); Mengel Co. v. Ishee, 192 Miss. 366,4 So. 2d 878 (1941).
Cases since 1948 denying removal: Carter v. Hill & Hill Truck Line, Inc., 259 F.
Supp. 429 (S.D. Tex. 1966); Wilkins v. Renault Southwest, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 647
(N.D. Tex. 1964); Zorilla v. Puerto Rican Cement Co., 227 F. Supp. 159 (D.P.R.
1964); Rolon v. Flexicore Co., 216 F. Supp. 954 (D.P.R. 1963); Dando v. Stonhard
Co., 93 F. Supp. 270 (W.D. Mo. 1950).
Cases since 1948 allowing removal: Goettel v. Glen Barry Mfrs., Inc., 236 F. Supp.
884 (N.D. Okla. 1964); Niswander v. Paul Hardeman, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 74 (E.D.
Ark. 1963); Carrero v. M. S. Kaplan Co., 161 F. Supp. 754 (D.P.R. 1958); Buckles v.
Morristown Kayo Co., 132 F. Supp. 555 (E.D. Tenn. 1955); Rossi v. Singer Sewing
Mach. Co., 127 F. Supp. 53 (D. Conn. 1954); Green v. Fluor Corp., 122 F. Supp. 224
(S.D.N.Y. 1954); Asher v. William L Crow Constr. Co., 118 F. Supp. 495 (S.D.N.Y.
1953); Korrell v. Bymarr, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 185 (E.D.N.Y. 1951).
8 259 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Tex. 1966).
7 Since 1948 eight cases have permitted removal, while five cases have disallowed it.
Cases since 1948 allowing and denying removal are cited note 5 supra.
8 227 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Tex. 1964).
9 1A MOORE, op. cit. supra note 4, at 962; see WRiGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 38, at
113 (1963).
10 Cases cited note 5 supra.
1128 U.S.C. § 14 4 1(a) (1964). Section 1441(a) is quoted in text accompanying
note 29 infra.
12 Prior to 1948 twenty-three cases denied removal, while eleven permitted it. Cases
prior to 1948 permitting and denying removal are cited note 5 supra.
13 Cases denying removal prior to 1948, cited note 5 supra, except those decided by
the Federal District Court for the Western District of Missouri, and Kuligowski v. Hart,
43 F. Supp. 207 (N.D. Ohio 1941).
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judgment."' 4  To have allowed removal would have been to deny
the plaintiff-employee his right to "maintain" suit in the state court
in which the action was originally brought. The word "maintain"
was given such meaning that it, in effect, amended the broad lan-
guage of the removal statute, 5 making it inapplicable to section
16(b) cases. 6
The courts developed several distinct arguments to justify equat-
ing "maintain" with "prosecute to judgment."'" The first, the "sur-
plusage" argument, proceeded from the premise that an employee,
in the absence of congressional enactment, possessed the right to
commence an action for the recovery of unpaid wages in a state
court. If "maintain" were held to mean merely "to commence,"
then the statutory grant of the right "to maintain" would be super-
fluous. The preferable approach, it was reasoned, was to hold that
the term "maintain" conferred a right to prosecute section 16(b)
actions to judgment in the court in which action was commenced,
thus eliminating any right to removal."8
The next rationale, the "harassment" argument, concerned the
substantive policy of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The courts urg-
1 4 E.g., Johnson v. Butler Bros., 162 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1947). The Johnson court
held that Congress intended, by its use of the word "maintain," that a § 16(b) action
"could be prosecuted to final judgment in the court in which it was commenced." Id.
at 89.
15The applicable provision of the removal statute prior to the 1948 amendment
read as follows: "Any suit of a civil nature, at law or in equity, arising under the Consti-
tution or laws of the United States ... of which the district courts of the United States
are given original jurisdiction .. . may be removed by the defendant... [from any state
court] to the district court of the United States... Judiciary Revision Act ch 3, 5
28, 36 Stat. 1094 (1911).
16 Wright v. Long, 65 F. Supp. 279 (W.D. Mo. 1944); cf. Sonnesyn v. Federal Car-
tridge Co., 54 F. Supp. 29 (D. Minn. 1944); Owens v. Greenville News-Piedmont, 43
F. Supp. 785 (W.D.S.C. 1942); Ricciardi v. Lazzara Baking Corp., 32 F. Supp. 956
(D.N.J. 1940).
The Wright court held that § 16(b) was intended by Congress to be an exception
to the general removal statute. Wright v. Long, supra at 279. Sonnesyn stressed that
holding "maintain" to be an equivalent for "prosecute to judgment" would constitute
an implicit amendment of the removal statute. Sonnesyn v. Federal Cartridge Co.,
supra at 35.
17 The first two arguments against removal will be referred to as the "surplusage"
argument and the "harassment" argument in text accompanying notes 18-20 infra.
18 Smith v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 209 (S.D. Iowa 1946); Young v.
Arbyrd Compress Co., 66 F. Supp. 241 (R.D. Mo. 1946); Steiner v. Pleasantville Con-
structors, Inc., 59 F. Supp. 1011 (S.D.N.Y. 1944); Apple v. Shulman Publications, Inc.,
65 F. Supp. 677 (D.N.J. 1943); Fredman v. Foley Bros., 50 F. Supp. 161 (W.D. Mo.
1943); Brantley v. Augusta Ice & Coal Co., 52 F. Supp. 158 (S.D. Ga. 1943).
The Fredman court considered it dubious that Congress "would expressly give a
right which already existed." Fredman v. Foley Bros., supra at 163. Fredman further
suggested that Congress would not have authorized the commencement of suit without
providing for its future course. Ibid.
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ing this argument viewed the congressional intent as seeking to as-
sure subsistence-level and lower-class workers an adequate standard
of living."9 A material aspect of the statute was the section 16(b)
provision for the expeditious recovery of unpaid wages. To have
permitted removal would have afforded defendant-employers a
means by which they could "harass" laborers into dropping poten-
tially successful suits due to the threat of travel and unforeseen liti-
gation expenses incident to removal, severely undercutting the value
of the Fair Labor Standards Act."
A small percentage of pre-1948 cases denying removal reasoned
that section 16(b) claims, in the absence of diversity of citizenship,
did not constitute "cases or controversies" arising under laws of the
United States2' because of the lack of a substantial federal question.22
Under this view, federal removal jurisdiction failed because the fed-
eral courts could not have decided section 16(b) cases originally.28
The primary argument of those pre-1948 cases permitting re-
29 E.g., Tobin v. Hercules Powder Co., 63 E Supp. 434 (D. Del. 1945).
The Senate Education and Labor Committee report concerning the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act, S. REP. No. 884, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1937), furnishes strong evidence
that Congress intended to benefit the laboring class. "It is only those low-wage and
long-working-hour industrial workers, who are the helpless victims of their own bar-
gaining weakness, that this bill seeks to assist to obtain a minimum wage." Ibid. How-
ever, neither the Senate Report nor the pertinent House Report, LR. REP. No. 1452,
75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937), referred specifically to the intended meaning of "main-
tain" in § 16(b).
20 Smith v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 209 (S.D. Iowa 1946); Tobin v.
Hercules Powder Co., 63 F. Supp. 434 (D. DeL 1945); Fredman v. Foley Bros., 50 F.
Supp. 161 (W.D. Mo. 1943); Booth v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 44 F. Supp. 451 (D.
Neb. 1942); Wingate v. General Auto Parts Co., 40 F. Supp. 364 (W.D. Mo. 1940);
Bell Aircraft Corp. v. Anderson, 73 Ga. App. 633, 38 S.E.2d 66 (1946).
The Wingate court asserted that, due to travel and litigation expenses, the Fair Labor
Standards Act would be of "slight value to workingmen" if removal were allowed.
Wingate v. General Auto Parts Co., supra at 365.
21 See 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1964).
22 See cases cited note 13 supra.
In Stewart v. Hickman, 36 F Supp. 861 (W.D. Mo. 1941), the court quoted from
Western Union TeL v. Ann Arbor 1KR., 178 U.S. 239, 243-44 (1900), as follows:
"'When a suit does not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy as to
the effect or construction of the Constitution or laws of the United States, upon the de-
termination of which the result depends, it is not a suit arising under the Constitution
or laws.'" Stewart v. Hickman, supra at 864.
Based upon the Anm Arbor standard, the § 16(b) case before the Stewart court was
held not to constitute a case or controversy because the outcome did not turn on the
construction of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
Implicit in the Stewart argument is the well-founded concern of the federal judi-
ciary for the over-crowding of trial dockets. A direct method for combatting this prob-
lem on the federal level is to eliminate cases that do not call for judicial interpretation.
A related argument is raised in the Carter case. See text accompanying note 41 infra.
23 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1964).
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moval also concerned the meaning of the word "maintain."2'  These
decisions indicated that equating "maintain" with "prosecute to judg-
ment" would be tantamount to an implicit amendment of the re-
moval statute. After demonstrating that the meaning of "maintain"
is uncertain, these cases concluded that it would be improper to hold
the removal statute amended by implication.25
The court in Aaker v. Kaiser Co.2" noted that Congress used
affirmative language to bar removal of certain cases arising under
the Federal Employer's Liability Act.27 This decision permitted
removal, reasoning that had Congress intended to block removal of
section 16(b) actions, it would have so provided in a manner com-
parable to its express provision that no case arising under the Fed-
eral Employer's Liability Act "brought in any state court of com-
petent jurisdiction shall be removed to any court of the United
States. ' 2
8
In 1948, however, the removal statute was amended to provide:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress,
any civil action brought in a state court of which the district
courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be re-
moved by the defendant . . . to the district court of the United
24 Aaker v. Kaiser Co., 74 F. Supp. 55 (D. Ore. 1947); Swettman v. Remington
Rand, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 940 (S.D. Ill. 1946); Sonnesyn v. Federal Cartridge Co., 54 F.
Supp. 29 (D. Minn. 1944); Owens v. Greenville News-Piedmont, 43 F. Supp. 785
(W.D.S.C. 1942); Ricciardi v. Lazzara Baking Co., 32 F. Supp. 956 (D.N.J. 1940); cf.
Harris v. Reno Oil Co., 48 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Tem 1943).25 E.g., Ricciardi v. Lazzara Baking Co., supra note 24, which held: "[Sio many
different and conflicting constructions appear to have been given [to 'maintain'] ...
that its character for exactitude of meaning is badly damaged. It would be indeed dan-
gerous to conclude that a word so weakened could be used to amend the removal
act ... I" d. at 958.
26 74 F. Supp. 55 (D. Ore. 1947).
27 Federal Employers' Liability Act § 1, 36 Star. 291 (1910) [hereinafter cited as
FELA).
28Ibid. The clause relating to removal was deleted by Congress in 1948. FELA
1, 36 Stat. 291 (1910), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1964).
Cox v. Gatliff Coal Co., 52 F. Supp. 482 (E.D. Ky. 1943), in addition to permitting
removal on the ground that "maintain" had an uncertain meaning, met the "surplusage"
argument squarely. For a discussion of the "surplusage" argument, see text accompany-
ing note 18 supra. The Cox court asserted that § 16(b)'s authorization for the recovery
by a plaintiff-employee of both minimum wages or overtime and an "additional equal
amount as liquidated damages" might reasonably be construed to be authorization for
the recovery of a penalty or forfeiture under the laws of the United States. Ordinarily,
suits for the recovery of such a penalty or forfeiture have been maintainable only in the
federal courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1355 (1964).
The court in Cox understood the purpose of Congress to be to "dissipate any doubt
as to the right and duty of state courts to entertain jurisdiction" of § 16(b) cases even
though "the extra recovery should be judicially determined to be in the nature of a pen-
alty or forfeiture." Cox v. Gatliff, supra at 484.
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States for the district and division embracing the place where such
action is pending2 9
Thereafter, the majority of courts began to permit removal of
section 16(b) cases." In contrast to the pre-1948 majority, the
later decisions were similar in rationale; all permitted removal on
the ground that "maintain" standing alone was not sufficiently "ex-
press" to meet the dictates of the revised statute,81 and as a supple-
mentary argument, several cases" recalled the reasoning of Aaker
V. Kaiser Co.
8
Until the Wilkins v. Renault Southwest, Inc.34 case in 1964, the
handful of cases disallowing removal disregarded the change in the
removal statute.8 5 Typically, the bases for these decisions was the
assertion that "maintain" is equivalent to "prosecute to judgment,"
in addition to citing pre-19 4 8 cases barring removal as authority."e
Wilkins was the first post-1948 case refusing removal which at-
tempted to grapple with the change in language of section 1441(a).
Wilkins disallowed removal on four grounds:" (1) a 1958 Senate
Judiciary Committee Report which stated that section 16(b) cases
were not removable; 8 (2) the word "maintain" was an express pro-
vision as required by the amended removal statute; (3) Congress
intended to contract, not expand the scope of removal by its 1948
amendments; and (4) to allow removal would defeat the substan-
tive policy of the Fair Labor Standards Act.9
29 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1964). (Emphasis added.)
80 Since the 1948 amendments eight cases have permitted removal of S 16(b) ac-
tions, while five, including Carter, have denied removal. Cases since 1948 permitting
and denying removal are cited note 5 sapra.
81 Cases since 1948 permitting removal cited note 5 supra.
82 Niswander v. Paul Hardeman, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 74 (E.D. Ark. 1963); Asher v.
William L. Crow Constr. Co., 118 F. Supp. 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
Niswander cited the "express" provisions in 28 U.S.C. § 1445 (1964), while the
Asher court noted the "express" provisions against removal in the Securities Act of
1933, § 22,48 Stat. 86, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77(v) (1964).
88 74 F. Supp. 55 (D. Ore. 1947). For a discussion of the Aaker argument, see text
accompanying notes 26-28 supra.
84 227 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Tem 1964).
85 Cases since 1948 denying removal cited note 5 supra, except Carter v. Hill & Hill
Truck Line, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Tex. 1966) and Wilkins v. Renault Southwest,
Inc, supra note 34.
86 E.g., Rolon v. Flexicore Co., 216 F. Supp. 954 (D.P.R. 1963).
37 227 F. Supp. at 648.
8s S. REp. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1958). "In ... the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act... the Congress has given the workingman the option of filing his case in
either the State court or the Federal court. If filed in the State court the law prohibits
removal to the Federal court." Ibid.
39 227 F. Supp. at 648.
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Essentially, Carter v. Hill & Hill Truck Line, Inc.4 ° has adopted
the reasoning of the Wilkins decision, adding little to the latter's
argument supporting the denial of removal. The Carter court did,
however, stress that its result would ease the problems created by
an overcrowded federal docket.41 In addition, the court quoted, in
the appendix to its opinion, a recent statement by the American
Law Institute favoring the denial of removal.4
The merits of the second and third arguments asserted by Vil-
kins supporting the refusal of removal are questionable. First, the
contention that the meaning of "maintain" is sufficiently certain so
as to constitute an express provision against removal is categorical
and unexplained.43 The split in authority prior to and following
1948 attest to the uncertain meaning of "maintain."44  Further-
more, neither Wilkins nor Carter resolve the difference between the
unequivocally express provision against removal in acts such as the
pre-1948 Federal Employer's Liability Act45 and the more implicit
provision in section 16(b) ."
The argument that Congress intended to contract removal juris-
diction by its 1948 changes in the Judicial Code is not effectively
supported. The case cited as authority, American Fire & Cas. Co.
v. Finn,4" did hold that the change in section 1441(c) of Tide 28
was intended to diminish removal jurisdiction, but Finn is silent
upon the intended effect of the change in section 1441 (a), the only
provision pertinent to the issue presented by Carter.48
40 259 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Tex. 1966).
41Id. at 430.
42 ALI JurISDICrIoN STUDY § 1312(d), comment at 79-80 (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1966). The American Law Institute draft condemned the allowing of removal on the
ground that employers misuse it as a device for delay and harassment. Ibid.
43 227 F. Supp. at 648. The Wilkins court stated only that "maintain" is "an ex-
press provision against removal within the meaning of ... the removal statute." Ibid.
44 See cases cited note 5 supra.
4 5 FELA § 1, 36 Stat. 291 (1910). For examples of other statutes containing "un-
equivocally express" provisions against removal, see statutes cited note 32 supra.
46 FLSA § 16(b), 52 Star. 1069 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1964).
For a discussion of the implicit "bar" to removal in § 16(b), see text accompanying notes
30-34 supra.
47341 U.S. 6 (1951).
48 Id. at 9-10. The Finn case was concerned with the construction of 28 U.S.C. §
144 1(c) (1964), which bears upon the removability of "separate" and "independent
questions." See generally WRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 4, § 39.
The Finn court cited the House Judiciary Committee Report dealing with the 1948
amendments to the Judicial Code, which stated that the change in § 1441(c) would
reduce the number of removable cases. The report did not state that the change in the
general removal provision, § 1441(a), was intended to reduce the number of removable
cases. H.R. REP. No. 3214, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A134 (1947).
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The fairest conclusion is that Wilkins and Carter have been
unable to demonstrate either that an undeniably express provision
against removal is contained within section 16(b), as required by
the 1948 amendment, or that the 1948 change in section 1441(a)
was intended to decrease removability, so that "express" could be
given an expansive construction.
The strength of the Carter-Wilkins rationale lies in its amplifi-
cation of the "harassment" argument:4
[Slmall [section 16(b)) cases should not be removable for a
very practical reason: removal was an obvious tactic by which the
defendant could delay, increase the costs of litigation and harass
the plaintiff: 'Where the employee commences such a suit in a
state court far removed from the nearest federal court the cost of
travel and subsistence of the claimant, his witnesses and attorneys,
would amount to a denial of the very cause of action conferred
by Congress in § 216(b). 50
Because the dollar amounts in suit under section 16(b) have typi-
cally been small,5 there is compelling merit to the argument that
the statutory right is jeopardized by the travel and litigation expense
resulting from removal. The significance of the Wilkins court's
failure to interrelate the "maintain" provision of the Fair Labor
Standards Act and the removal statute is diminished upon consider-
ation of the policy of section 16(b). By adhering to the abstract
and formalistic niceties of statutory construction, the contemporary
majority of courts neglect, if not totally disregard, the substance of
an act intended to benefit the laboring class. The justice of the
Carter result makes it the preferable view."
49 For a discussion of the "harassment" argument, see text accompanying notes
19-20 supra.
50 Wilkns v. Renault Southwest, Inc, 227 F. Supp. 647, 648 (N.D. Tem 1964).
51 E.g., Carter v. Hill & Hill Truck Line, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Tex. 1966)
($4,810.26); Buckles v. Morristown Kayo Co., 132 F. Supp. 555 (E.D. Tenn. 1955)
(less than $3,000); Wright v. Long, 65 F. Supp. 279 (W.D. Mo. 1944) (less than
$3,000); McGarrigle v. 11 West Forty-Second St. Corp., 48 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y.
1942) ($1,700).52 An argument based upon the rules of statutory construction that might have been
utilized by the Carter court is the "surplusage" argument. Although this argument
does not meet the contemporary majority's argument squarely, it firmly supports the
Carter result. For a discussion of the strengths and infirmities of the "surplusage"
argument. see note 28 and text accompanying note 18 supra.
It should be pointed out that several post-1948 cases which upheld removal sug-
gested that a more equitable result could be attained by remanding § 16(b) actions to
state courts. These cases held, however, that the broad language of the removal statute
compelled the respective courts to retain jurisdiction of the removed cases. Niswander
v. Paul Hardeman, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 74 (E.D. Ark. 1963); Asher v. William L Crow
Constr. Co., 118 F. Supp. 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Korell v. Bymart, Inc, 101 F. Supp.
185 (E.D.N.Y. 1951).
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